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639 
HARMONIZATION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Moderator: Frederic Bloom 
Participants: Geoffrey Hazard, Michele Taruffo 
HALEY: I want to welcome you back. I hope you had a good evening. I 
will reconvene this morning. Today we have two panels and two 
substantive papers after lunch. Our panels this morning deal with problems 
of harmonization, convergence, and procedure. We begin with a panel on 
transnational litigation. Our moderator is Professor Frederic Bloom from 
St. Louis University. I turn it over to you.  
BLOOM: Good morning. Thank you. As Professor Haley noted, the 
focus of the panel is the harmonization of differing civil procedure 
regimes in the transnational context. In the past few years, a great deal of 
work has been directed toward creating a rational transnational civil 
procedure system. This morning we will have the pleasure of listening to 
three of the true engines and luminaries in this field: Professor Hazard, 
Professor Taruffo, and Professor Gidi, all of whom have worked to fashion 
a body of innovative solutions to transnational civil procedure hurdles. 
Together, these three can provide a uniquely informed perspective on the 
challenges and structures of transnational civil procedure.  
Professor Hazard is the Trustee Professor of Law at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. A prolific scholar and distinguished teacher, 
Professor Hazard is an expert in the areas of legal ethics, federal courts, 
and civil procedure, as a long list of publications and awards attests. 
Before joining the faculty at Penn, Professor Hazard taught at Yale 
University, the University of Chicago, and the University of California, 
Berkeley. He also served as a visiting professor at Arizona University, 
Arizona State, Harvard Law School, and Stanford Law School. From 1984 
to 1999, Professor Hazard was the Director of the American Law Institute 
and he serves as the co-reporter for the ALI-UNIDROIT Project on 
Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure. This project, of 
course, is at the heart of the topic this morning. It is a true honor to 
introduce Professor Hazard.  
HAZARD: Thank You. A pleasure to be with you. I’m delighted to say 
that I have my colleague Michele Taruffo with me, who was the originator 
of the transnational rules project, and my colleague Antonio Gidi, who 
came on the project at an early stage and has stayed with it all the way 
through. He has provided continual technical assistance, and a good deal 
of substantive assistance, consistent with his junior position in the faculty 
world. One other person whose name should be mentioned is Rolf Sterner 
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of the University of Freiberg in Germany, who got involved with the 
project in a way I will identify in a moment.  
I am mindful that a number of you are quite familiar with the 
transnational civil procedure project, because some of you participated in 
one way or another in it. I hope you will forgive me if I give a brief reprise 
of what the project was and where it is for the benefit of the rest of the 
audience.  
The project started about ten years ago over a cup of coffee between 
Michele and myself at an international legal conference on comparative 
civil procedure. We noted an awful lot of talk about the difficulties of 
harmonization, but wondered whether it really could be done. Michele 
said “Well, who knows. Maybe it can. Let’s try.” So Michele and I 
exchanged documents, texts, and drafts for about a year and a half, trying 
to see whether one of us could draft something. We worked in English 
because Michele is completely fluent in English, and my Italian is a little 
weak. At the end of that initial period, we concluded that we could get 
close enough. We were emboldened to propose it to the ALI, which we 
did. I was then Director, so I had an inside track to access. They were quite 
concerned, as I learned, about whether we knew what we were doing, and 
they had some considerable skepticism. ALI set up an independent 
committee to look at the possibility of harmonization, and the committee 
concluded that there was enough of a prospect to authorize it.  
We were quite aware that the project would be intellectually 
impoverished and politically vulnerable if we did not have additional 
international participation. Therefore, we approached UNIDROIT, and 
they agreed to consider a collaboration. UNIDROIT appointed Rolf 
Sterner, who was a friend and colleague of Herbert Kronke, the director of 
UNIDROIT at the time. Kronke rightfully had confidence in Rolf to do an 
appraisal of the project, and he and Rolf completed a report that was 
guardedly supportive. Supportive in that he said yes, it’s worth trying, 
guarded in the sense that he thought there were some important aspects of 
the project that needed to be changed. So with joint sponsorship, we 
began. 
It was around then that Gidi enrolled in the graduate program at Penn. 
He came with an introduction from Taruffo and also another colleague of 
ours who is now in Genoa, Angelo Dundi. One of the great positive 
accidents was the involvement of Gidi, because it meant there was always 
immediately at hand a strong-willed common law participant, me, and 
somebody familiar with the civil law tradition and technically acquainted 
with civil law civil procedure. So we began to draft.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/13
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UNIDROIT appointed a group called the working group, ALI had its 
usual advisory system, and we began a series of meetings. The meetings 
followed a pattern approximately similar to UNIDROIT, and certainly 
similar to ALI meetings, in which the reporters do a draft. I will begin by 
explaining my view of drafting, which is one that I am glad my colleagues 
shared and which I strongly recommend. Always envision that you are 
doing the final draft. Write the draft as you now think it ultimately ought 
to be. No prospectuses, prolegomena—none of that. Just do it. Also, to the 
extent possible, start with the hard parts, because if you can work through 
the hard parts so that you are more or less satisfied with them, then the rest 
of the project can go. If you spend a lot of time, as it were, doing 
background work—which is a classic tradition not only in European 
scholarship, but in American scholarship too—you can spend a lot of time 
without really realizing whether you can pull the project off.  
We began drafting the text, and it was submitted annually, in one-week 
sessions in Rome to UNIDROIT, and in two-day sessions following the 
ALI pattern in the United States The draft was also presented as the annual 
ALI meeting. We went through a series of drafts with the philosophy I 
have described: as you are writing, you are trying to do your best work 
writing a final text. Of course you are going to revise it, but the whole idea 
of the project is encapsulated by the following: a draft is a set of questions 
in the form of an answer. You must understand that people are going to 
say, “I don’t know about this. I don’t understand that. I think this is 
wrong.”  
You should be receptive to that kind of criticism and listen to 
understand, not to create a counter-argument. This is something that I 
think I have learned. To the extent I have learned it, I learned it the hard 
way. 
We finally produced a text that I am glad to say was approved by the 
UNIDROIT council in April 2004, and by the ALI annual meeting in May 
2004. We have since been involved in making a number of minor changes. 
I say a number because there are probably fifty or one-hundred places 
where we have changed the text. Minor, because they are all minor 
changes.  
One major change that was accomplished at an early stage was to 
convert the concept of the project from a code of rules into a set of 
principles. It turns out that the difference in terminology is, to an 
important extent, rhetorical, political, and cosmetic. If you are going to be 
serious about this, you have to strive for a reasonable degree of detail. It is 
said that the devil is in the details, and that is true. Unless you focus on 
details, you often do not know whether you have something that will work 
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and whether it’s intelligible, operable, and so on. The ultimate project 
consists of principles which are relatively detailed. There are about thirty-
four or thirty-five principles that do everything from introducing to talking 
about a collateral attack on a judgment and cooperative enforcement. An 
annex of rules tracks the principles and supplies some additional detail.  
UNIDROIT felt much more comfortable promulgating a project called 
“principles,” and ALI did not have any trouble going along with that. ALI 
has done that sort of thing on a couple of other projects unrelated to this 
topic. But I want to stress that getting fine detail is very important, and let 
me just give one illustration.  
The question of whether proceedings, following the civil procedure 
covered by these rules for international commercial transactions, should be 
public. You have got two very strong traditions. The United States and 
most of the common law countries believe everything in a court 
proceeding is public. You have other legal traditions, Japan for example, 
that believe the parties have a right to maintain the proceeding in 
confidence. We always had in the back of our minds that these principles 
had to be thought of as useful in arbitration, and arbitration by definition is 
confidential. So we had a very tough time. We went over it several times 
and wound up with a solution of Solomon that really straddled the 
problem, because we felt that these are fundamental concepts in legal 
systems, and they are antagonistic. So what are you going to say about it? 
We wound up straddling the issue. I don’t have any apology for that, and I 
understand that you can write a well-articulated brief on either side of the 
proposition. But in most instances we did not have this problem.  
I now want to return to two general points and then pass the 
microphone to my colleague Michele. First, I am not fundamentally a 
comparativist. I have become one late in life. Comparative law scholars 
tend to emphasize differences. If you are articulating German civil 
procedure to an English audience, you are destined to focus on the ways in 
which German procedure differs from English procedure. That is okay, but 
it is not a good route to harmonization. Rather, in harmonization you want 
to see whether beneath the evident linguistic differences there are 
fundamental functional similarities. This is where Michele and I began our 
journey, thinking about how these systems work. This is not a criticism of 
comparative legal scholarship. It is an observation about the necessary 
character or the typical characteristic of comparative legal scholarship, 
which needs to be modified when you are trying to work out a set of legal 
institutions that would work in different legal traditions.  
The other key point in my estimate was beginning to think about civil 
litigation in a way that Michele and I had shared in our discussions for 
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twenty years. We have known each other happily for a long time. As a 
teacher in the United States, I think of civil litigation as beginning with the 
role of the lawyer. If you think about a civil dispute in a civil law system, 
the traditional discourse begins with the role of the judge. But if you think 
about the lawsuit, how did the judge know that there was a lawsuit? Well, 
a complaint was filed. What are the requirements of the complaint in a 
civil law system? They are the requirements of the specification, of what it 
is the plaintiff says happened, and why the plaintiff (according to the 
plaintiff) is entitled to a remedy.  
One of the things that was pressed hard on me, by Gidi in particular, is 
that in the civil law tradition the judge is strictly bound by that 
formulation. You do not have anything like the American liberality in 
modifying the framing of the case and accounting for the information 
learned in discovery. Gidi said we do not have discovery. Civil systems 
start with what the lawyer says to the court, and the court is essentially 
bound by that statement of claims. One can see that if you assume a 
similar obligation is imposed on lawyers in a common law system—and it 
is in all systems except the United States—then you can see that the 
fundamental impetus of the lawsuit and its defining characteristic in 
substantive terms is going to be the same in a civil law system as it is in a 
common law system.  
I knew from my experience in the United States that code pleading 
used to be the rule in the United States as well. So, if you start with code 
pleading you see that from then on all systems rely on a tripartite 
interaction between the lawyers, functioning within their respective 
traditions, and the judge. Then the rest of the procedure is an interaction, 
tripartite dynamic, and we asked, what are they going to be talking about? 
This analysis led to writing rules for the conversation or principles of civil 
procedure.  
I am satisfied that these principles of civil procedure would work in the 
United States The principles have been tested by many lawyers in the ALI, 
whom I consider to be an excellent critical audience. They are well-
regarded by lawyers and judges in the common law countries, for 
example, Canada and Australia. I am also satisfied that they would work 
in civil law systems, because Michele, Antonio, and my colleague Rolf 
Sterner in Germany all tell me so. I have every reason to believe them.  
BLOOM: Professor Michele Taruffo is a professor of law at the 
University of Pavia. An expert on legal theory, comparative law, and civil 
procedure, Professor Taruffo has served as a visiting professor at Cornell 
University School of Law and at the Hastings College of Law, University 
of California, San Francisco. Professor Taruffo is the author of a number 
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of articles and books and he has collaborated with Professor Hazard 
before, co-authoring American Civil Procedure: An Introduction.1 As 
Professor Hazard noted, Professor Taruffo has also worked on the ALI 
UNIDROIT project for the Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil 
Procedure, serving as Co-Reporter with Professor Ralph Sterner and 
Professor Hazard. It is my pleasure to introduce Professor Taruffo. 
TARUFFO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
If I had to define this project in three words, I would use this definition: 
a piece of living, comparative law. Why living? Because we were not just 
starting with different procedural systems in order to compare them with a 
tripartite system. As Geoff was saying, we wanted to do much more than 
that. We wanted to rely upon a fully broad knowledge of the most 
important procedural systems in order to create something. In my opinion, 
this is not the usual kind of work for the average comparativist. Usually 
when we practice comparative law, we study, but we don’t try to make 
law. This is a distinctive feature of what we tried to do. There are some 
topics I would like to stress from the point of view of the method that we 
used.  
I am not going to be excessively boring, going through the contents of 
the project. As Geoff said, it begins with issues of jurisdiction, and it ends 
with enforcement of judgments. It is not a code. It is not very long. There 
are some dozens of principles and some dozens of rules. To an American 
audience, it may be useful to compare this text with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Many of the topics are the same as you may find 
regulated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. The format of the text is something like those. But since we are 
here in a conference about comparative law, I would like to discuss two or 
three points concerning methodology, or at least the kind of method we 
tried to apply in doing this work.  
We did not start by comparing specific procedural rules to register 
similarities and differences between some provisions existing in Germany, 
France, Canada, Australia, Japan, China, and so on, with the aim of 
building up a list of similarities and differences. This was not our goal. Of 
course, we used all the available sources about the topics we were dealing 
with, but not in that way. We were not interested in making a list. We used 
a different approach. We started discussing and considering which were, in 
our opinion of course, the most important problems in the functioning of 
 1. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE: AN 
INTRODUCTION (Yale University Press 1993). 
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civil litigation in the most important systems we were considering. The 
range was the United States, England, Canada, most of the European 
systems, Japan, to some extent China, and to some extent Latin America. 
We selected some dozens of problems and decided arbitrarily, but maybe 
not in an absurd way, that those were the most important topics to 
consider. Then we applied what in sociology might be defined as the 
method of functionally equivalent solutions.  
After having identified the problems, we discussed the range of 
solutions and compared those solutions. This allowed us to intellectually 
shift. We were considering apparently different or even conflicting 
regulations as possible answers to the same kinds of problems. So we 
discussed first the problems, then the various solutions. This is different 
from the usual analytically detailed, micro-comparative work many of our 
colleagues are doing. And it allowed us not to be excessively conditioned 
by differences. When you reason from a common problem to a variety of 
solutions, it is easier to find the similarities at the level of the problem 
being solved than it is to consider the differences at the level of the 
specific solutions. We were not looking for a sort of minimum common 
denominator in all the alternative solutions that we found. We were not 
interested in finding an average, generally acceptable solution for these 
problems.  
Our aim, though not very modest, was to find, for each of the problems 
we selected, what seemed to us the ideal or relatively better solution. We 
were not working at the average level, or at the bottom level. We were 
working at the highest possible level. That is why I said we were not very 
modest, but we were having a lot of fun doing this kind of work. It was not 
boring. It was fascinating.  
The aim of finding, through a comparison of the functionally 
equivalent solutions, the relatively better one, was not easy. This required 
not only reading the rules and comparing them, but also collecting data, 
information, and experiences concerning the actual functioning of those 
rules. We needed to know the practical impact of the interpretation and 
application of rules upon the practice of civil litigation in a number of 
different systems.  
The method we followed was to have a lot of meetings with lawyers, 
judges, professors, and arbitrators in several parts of the world. This was 
not only for tourism purposes. We were interested in learning from people 
in various parts of the world how things were going in their practice of 
litigation. We were able to read the code and the rules without traveling, 
but of course, that was not enough. The law in the rules was not enough. 
The law in the books was not enough for the kind of enterprise we were 
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engaged in. While looking for the relatively better solution to the 
problems, we faced different kinds of situations. Sometimes we found 
among the existing practical solutions a relatively better one. But then we 
were often faced with conflicts.  
I provide two examples to help you understand the nature of the 
problem. One example, already noted by Geoff, is the model of pleading, 
or fact pleading versus notice pleading. Here we were faced with a strong 
and long European continental tradition of fact pleading in which the 
statement of the claim has to include a detailed allegation of all the 
relevant facts. This is the practice in Italy, Germany, France, Spain, and so 
on. As Geoff said, and as you know very well, under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the United States has notice pleading as the leading 
model for the statement of the claim. We had to make a choice—a 
relatively simple choice because we had only two alternatives. We made a 
choice in favor of the fact pleading system. We found models of fact 
pleading in European codes. We may borrow the rules from Germany, 
Italy, and France. They are more or less the same. Only the details may be 
different, but this is a very well-defined type of solution. It was easy. Not 
so easy to explain to American lawyers. Because they were accustomed to 
notice pleading, we had to explain why we were choosing fact pleading as 
the solution.  
Another example is expert evidence. Here, differences were even more 
dramatic. I do not need to explain to an American audience how the expert 
witness is used in the American system. However, the civil law, the 
European tradition, was and still is completely different. The expert is not 
a witness—he is the expert. He or she is appointed by the court. She has to 
be neutral and so on and so on. Here again we have two completely 
different models, and once again we made a choice and preferred the 
European continental model. If you look at the principles and the rules 
dealing with expert evidence, you may perceive that this solution is more 
or less an almost literal translation of rules found in European codes. Once 
again, we set aside the American model in favor of the European model.  
I am stressing this in order to say that, although we were working with 
the support of the American Law Institute and although we were using the 
English language, we were not conditioned by those factors. When we 
thought the best solution was the European, the French rather than the 
Japanese solution, we decided in favor of that solution. Our main concern 
was which system works better as a solution to the problem of providing 
the court with reliable, neutral knowledge of the scientific data the court 
needs to decide the case.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/13
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In many cases, we were not satisfied by any of the pre-existing 
solutions we found by analyzing the materials we had. In such cases we 
were even less modest than on the other point, because if we did not find a 
ready-made solution, we invented or created one. We had no limits in 
doing this.  
Two examples will illustrate this. First, the examination of witnesses 
once again follows two different traditions. In Anglo-American systems, 
witnesses are subjected to direct and cross-examination by lawyers. In 
civil law systems examination is performed by the court. We learned on 
the two sides of the divide between common law and civil law that neither 
of these solutions is working well in its pure form. Geoff was not satisfied 
with the functioning of the practice of cross-examination. I was not at all 
satisfied with the practice of having witnesses examined by the court. Here 
the problem was not choosing one of the two. It was trying to create a new 
solution. So we did.  
We tried to build rules combining the role of the court and the role of 
the lawyers of the parties. We tried to combine the best parts of the two 
models rather than combining the worst parts of the two models, as often 
happens. For instance, when cross-examination is transplanted into civil 
law systems it does not work. As it didn’t work in Japan and as it doesn’t 
work in the Italian criminal procedure for instance. So we built, tried at 
least to build, new rules combining the positive aspects of the two 
systems.  
Another example was discovery: non-discovery, open-ended discovery, 
American style limited document discovery, English style. Well, at a 
certain point we stopped using the term discovery because outside the 
United States it is not very popular. We were getting negative reactions in 
France, for instance, just by using the term “discovery.” So we made what 
Geoff calls cosmetic changes. We changed the vocabulary. We cancelled 
the term “discovery,” which is dangerous because of how it sounds, and 
instead we used disclosure, which is more popular, less dangerous, and 
accepted by the French. They did not perceive that it was just cosmetics. It 
worked, and so it was a good move.  
In continental Europe, we don’t have anything equivalent to the Anglo-
American discovery, but I was aware that if we used a double-phased 
structure of pretrial and trial for the proceeding, we should have something 
equivalent to discovery in pretrial. In Italy and France, we do not have 
discovery, not because we do not need it, but because the structure of the 
proceeding is different. The way lawyers learn about the facts and the 
available evidence is structurally different. We adopted the two-phase 
model of proceeding in the project, so we were obliged to build a form of 
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discovery. The form of discovery we drafted is very different from the 
American model of pretrial discovery. It is different from the non-existent 
discovery in continental Europe, and it is also different from the English 
documentary discovery. We tried to draft rules of disclosure that could 
work within the procedural structure.  
Another important point is the method we followed in those years 
drafting and re-drafting this text. In the meetings we had with groups of 
lawyers from all kinds of legal practices and backgrounds, including China 
and Japan and other places, we were not looking for consensus. We were 
looking for objections. We were looking for the reactions of lawyers 
belonging to different cultures and to different historical and institutional 
traditions. In some cases we were amazed to find out that those different 
cultures and traditions were not real obstacles. For instance, after having 
spent two full days in Beijing with a group of Chinese lawyers, I was 
surprised that we were talking more or less the same conceptual language, 
notwithstanding the divide of our cultures.  
What are we going to do with this after almost ten years of work? Well, 
we do not really know how this project will be used. It could be used in 
different ways as a basis for an international convention concerning 
transnational civil litigation, or as a model law. It could be adopted in 
national procedural systems as a set of special rules for times when a 
national court has to decide a transnational case. It could be used as a term 
of reference for domestic reforms concerning civil procedure as some 
foreign colleagues suggested to us. With some minor adaptations, it could 
be used in international arbitration. These possible uses do not conflict 
with each other. We will see what will happen, but I would like to stress 
that this project might be used also at the level of scientific research. It 
could be taken as a standing reference point for a comparative study of the 
national procedural systems. This could be done at the international level 
as a sort of test of the acceptability of international systems.  
I have just one example in mind. The WTO system for settling disputes 
is under attack from many points of view. Is it judicial or not judicial? Is it 
a fair trial or not a fair trial? This text could be used to make systematic 
evaluations about existent systems or to interpret and assess the pros and 
the cons of national systems of procedure. We were told many times in 
many countries that their own procedural systems could improve very 
much by following the lines we laid down in the project. I am sure my 
own national system could be improved. Italy would have a much better 
system of litigation if we adopt this draft. The draft could provide a kind 
of common standpoint from which to consider existing systems.  
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Another interesting but very complex problem is that the principles and 
rules do not cover all the aspects and details of a procedure of civil 
litigation. Therefore, they should be combined with the existing procedural 
rules in any national system. Combining the different sets of procedural 
rules may give rise to a lot of technical and cultural problems.  
At least three types of problems exist. Cultural differences, between the 
kind of culture laid down in this project and the local culture of the 
national system in which the problem is considered, represent the first type 
of problem. Second, the principles are more general than ordinary 
procedural rules, so they could be considered as general standards to be 
applied vertically, so to speak, to the existing procedural rules. This could 
mean an improvement on the existing rules but also a lot of conflict. The 
publicity of the proceedings is just one example. Another example is the 
principle of necessary written justification of judgments in systems like 
the American system, in which a constitutional provision does not exist. 
Finally, if a national system considers the rules that are more specific, 
there may be a problem of horizontal harmonization. The general standard 
would be that where a topic is regulated by these principles and/or rules, 
they supercede. It can be a very difficult and puzzling kind of job to 
imagine, for instance, how to combine the transnational principles with the 
German civil process or the Cour de Procedure Civile in France or here 
with the federal and state rules. But this is nothing special. We were not 
solving all the problems of the world. It is better to leave something for 
other people to do. Thank you.  
BLOOM: Thank you, Professor Taruffo. To help us frame our ongoing 
discussion of the harmonization topic, we will now hear a few remarks 
from Professor Antonio Gidi. Professor Gidi is an Assistant Professor of 
Law at the University of Detroit, Mercy College of Law. Before joining 
the faculty at Detroit Mercy, Professor Gidi taught for several years as an 
adjunct professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. A true 
polyglot, Professor Gidi has written and published extensively in 
Portuguese, Spanish, and English, and he serves as a general reporter in a 
project sponsored by the Ibero-American Institute of Civil Procedure to 
create a model class action code for Latin America. Professor Gidi is the 
Associate Reporter and Secretary to the ALI-UNIDROIT Project on 
Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure.  
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